COP28: The art of compromise in the UAE Consensus
Hailed variously by the COP28 Presidency and UNFCCC as a “victory for multilateralism”, a “historic turning point”, a meeting that puts 1.5°C back in reach and the "beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era", the 28th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change closed with the adoption of the UAE Consensus.
Given where things stood on 12 December 2023 when COP28 was scheduled to conclude, the fact that a successful conclusion was reached after only a further 24 hours of negotiations was both surprising and remarkable.
Closing statements made by the parties however highlighted the challenges involved in reaching that compromise. As well publicised, many parties were critical of the lack of a clear reference to fossil fuel phase-out, as well as weak language on coal and methane. Others were critical of the failure to address the risks associated with "transitional fuels", such as gas, which the decision text says “can play a role in facilitating the energy transition while ensuring energy security.” On the other hand, many parties, in particular Russia and OPEC countries, found the reference to any specific global efforts too prescriptive, emphasising the bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement through nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
Global Stocktake
The Global Stocktake (GST) is considered the central outcome of COP28 as it contains every element that was under negotiation.
The decision on the first GST under the Paris Agreement recognises that the parties are not on track when it comes to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. With that is an acknowledgment of the clear need for deep, rapid, and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in line with 1.5°C pathways. It encourages parties to come forward in their next NDCs due in 2025 with ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all GHGs, sectors and categories and aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5°C.
The decision text ultimately contained stronger and more ambitious language than earlier versions which attracted significant criticism. In particular it calls on parties to contribute to a series of global efforts, including:
- “tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030”;
- accelerating efforts towards the phase down of unbated coal power and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies;
- accelerating efforts globally towards net zero emission energy systems, utilizing zero- and low-carbon fuels well before or by around mid-century
- accelerating zero- and low-emission technologies, including, inter alia, renewables, nuclear, abatement and removal technologies such as carbon capture and utilization and storage, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors, and low-carbon hydrogen production;
- accelerating and substantially reducing non-carbon-dioxide emissions globally, including in particular methane emissions by 2030;
- accelerating the reduction of emissions from road transport on a range of pathways, including through development of infrastructure and rapid deployment of zero and low-emission vehicles; and
- the “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science”.
For the first time, a COP decision has made a clear statement in respect of the need to reduce the use of fossil fuels, surprising in itself given the host of COP28, but also the role of nuclear energy as a potential low emissions technology. The text also reinforces the expectation that developed countries will continue to take the lead in the global efforts to transition.
Mitigation ambition
The Sharm El-Sheikh Mitigation Work Program (MWP) launched last year at COP27 became bogged down early with differences over the scope and the mandate of the MWP. Little progress was made over the two weeks, with the draft decision containing mainly procedural elements.
While it would seem obvious that the GST should cross-reference the MWP as a key initiative for driving mitigation activity, this did not occur. Instead, as noted above, the GST itself identifies a number of key mitigation activities which parties are expected to progress through their NDCs. Work on the MWP will therefore continue with two global dialogues to be held each year until 2030.
Carbon markets
To the frustration of many parties and business groups, parties failed to agree on further guidance under Article 6.2 and on elements to operationalise the Article 6.4 mechanism. We identified some of the outstanding issues here. Indeed, on one view, things actually went backwards as some countries attempted to reopen previous agreed positions, ultimately succeeding in frustrating the implementation of market-based approaches.
This represents yet another missed opportunity to provide certainty to market participants, critical to unleashing private finance and investment in emissions reduction (and potentially emissions removal) projects. Further consideration of these matters has yet again been kicked down the road until the next technical session of the Subsidiary Bodies in June 2024 in Bonn. With any luck, a resolution will be achieved by COP29 next year.
Climate finance
While new pledges were made to various funds, including the Green Climate Fund, Least Developed Countries Fund, the Adaptation Fund and Special Climate Change Fund, these pledges fall far short of the amount need to support developing countries to transition to clean energy, implement their NDCs and assist in adaptation efforts. Negotiations under different finance items ultimately achieved little progress.
The decision text of the GST recognised the need to reform international and multilateral finance to identify new and innovative sources of finance, including from the private sector.
Discussions continued on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG), to be agreed on at COP29, with the focus on developing guidance for the continuing work in 2024. The new goal, which will start from a baseline of USD 100 billion per year, will be a building block for the design and subsequent implementation of NDCs that need to be delivered by 2025.
Loss and damage
Unusually, talks about Loss and Damage were comparatively easy at COP28 – it was everything else that was hard.
One of the early wins was the adoption of a set of recommendations developed by a transitional committee working to operationalise the new Loss and Damage Fund established at COP27. A number of pledges of funding were made to the new fund which now has both an interim governance structure and developing mandate. Total pledges made in Dubai added up to USD770.6million, a welcome start but only a fraction of needs of impacted developing countries – it is estimated that the pledges account for less than 1% of what the demand for support is likely to be. Work also still needs to be done on defining which developing countries will be eligible to receive support from the fund and the manner in which support is provided (grants versus loans), but it provided a ray of hope to many countries particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts.
Global Goal on Adaptation
Negotiations on the Global Goal for Adaptation (GGA) were always going to be challenging – defining and putting metrics around adaptation. Australia had a central role in those negotiations with Assistant Minister for Climate Change and Energy, Senator Jenny McAllister, facilitating consultations on climate adaptation.
Progress was made with the parties adopting a decision in the Closing Plenary which sets agreed targets and establishes the GGA's framework. In brief, the framework identifies what global resilience to the impacts of a changing climate looks like, and how to assess countries’ efforts to meet those resilience targets. The framework reflects a global consensus on adaptation targets and the need for finance, technology and capacity-building support to achieve them.
Just Transition Work Programme
Unfinished technical discussions under the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) agenda item continued at COP28, seeing differences of opinion not only on text drafting but on the objective and scope of the work programme itself. For example, views differed fundamentally on the meaning of the concept of "just transition" and whether there is a single transition or multiple transitions which should be covered by the JTWP. For developed countries such as Australia, the primary focus is workers and regional communities transitioning away from emissions intensive industries.
A draft proposal was agreed by parties which confirms the objective of the JTWP to be the discussion of pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement as outlined in Article 2.1 and sets out a list of elements to be included in the work. Some of the elements in the work programme include:
- development of transition pathways that include energy, socio-economic and workforce defined by nationally defined development priorities and include social protection; and
- opportunities, challenges and barriers relating to sustainable development and poverty eradication as part of transitions globally to low emissions and climate resilience at the national and international level.
At least two dialogues will be held each year as part of the work program, with the first one to take place in June 2024. The work of the JTWP is intended to also inform the second GST.
The challenge ahead
Azerbaijan is set to host COP29 from 11-22 November 2024, and Brazil as COP30 host from 10-21 November 2025.
The next two years will be critical. At COP29, parties are required to establish a new climate finance goal, reflecting the scale and urgency of the climate challenge. Given the limited progress yet again made on finance at COP28, this will be a high hurdle. The following year at COP30, parties must submit new NDCs that are economy-wide, cover all greenhouse gases and are fully aligned with the 1.5°C temperature limit. This too will be challenging given the latest synthesis report on current NDC commitments, if implemented, would reduce emissions on average by 2% compared to 2019 levels by 2030, well short of the 43% reduction required.
As Australia has lodged an expression of interest to host COP31 in 2026, it may well be dealing with some significant unresolved issues if past experience is anything to go by.