NER amended to allow interconnector cost allocation agreements
The New Rule allows Ministers to agree a cost allocation that can smooth asymmetric bill impacts, particularly if the impact may delay or jeopardise delivery of an interconnector, which will be of interest for projects where there is a risk that one region may bear a disproportionate share of the costs, even if the project offers net benefits to the entire National Electricity Market.
On 3 October 2024, the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) published a rule that introduces a second, alternative pathway for allocating locational transmission charges to an electricity interconnector.[1] The New Rule, made in response to a request from the Ministers for Energy of the Commonwealth, Victoria and Tasmania, allows the National Electricity Rules (NER) to give effect to an inter-governmental agreement made by the Energy Ministers from two or more regions in the National Electricity Market (NEM) (ie. the States) about the relative contribution of the signatory jurisdictions to interconnector costs.
The New Rule commences on 3 July 2025.
The need for flexibility when allocating the interconnector costs
The NEM is undergoing a major transformation as Australia moves towards net zero emissions. Reducing carbon emissions requires substantial investment in renewable energy generation and the transmission infrastructure necessary to deliver electricity from the generation site to the population centres where it is consumed. Interconnectors play a critical role by enabling electricity to flow between adjacent regions when there is excess generation in one region and excess demand in the other.
The current methodology for allocating the interconnector costs between the two regions it connects is set out in Chapter 6A of the NER. In general terms, the methodology allows the transmission network service provider (TNSP) owner of the interconnector to impose transmission charges on a neighbouring TNSP based on the energy flows to the second TNSP’s region. This charge is called the modified load export charge (MLEC). It is paid for by the transmission network users in the paying TNSP’s region.
Importantly, the New Rule does not alter the existing MLEC approach. Rather, the new pathway recognises that the MLEC’s inflexible nature can present challenges for new or upgraded interconnector infrastructure projects. For instance, a project that is expected to benefit multiple regions may be delayed or cancelled if the MLEC methodology results in a disproportionate financial impact on the customers of one region relative to the benefits other customers receive. In an environment where transmission investment is essential to attracting renewable generation capacity, deterring interconnector projects could prejudice Australia’s ability to achieve its net zero targets. Therefore, the New Rule intends to introduce flexibility to respond to these and other barriers to project delivery.
The new pathway for allocating costs
The New Rule allows governments to allocate interconnector costs in proportions, or using a methodology that determines the proportions, that differ from the rigid MLEC approach. The contribution of each jurisdiction, called the “transfer amount”, is intended to reflect the broader costs and benefits of the interconnector that accrue to that jurisdiction by requiring TNSP A’s customers who receive more benefit to pay the transfer amount to TNSP B, thus reducing the transmission charges the TNSP B’s customers are required to pay. This allows the financial impact associated with the interconnector to be distributed more equitably between the regions. The impact of these agreements on a TNSP’s revenue and transmission charging is discussed further below.
Because the agreement is between Ministers, the New Rule amends Chapter 6A to require TNSPs[2] to recover the transfer amount. In order for a TNSP to operationalise an agreement made under the New Rules, the TNSP must submit a revised pricing methodology[3], which must be approved by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER).
To ensure transparency and fairness, the AER will only accept a TNSP’s pricing methodology based on an interconnector cost allocation agreement if the agreement meets the following requirements:
- The Agreement can only be made for:
- a new interconnector, where construction had not commenced as at 3 October 2024; or
- an interconnector:
- whose capacity has been materially updated;
- where construction on the upgrade commenced after 3 October 2024; and
- where the upgrade project is classified as an actionable project in the Integrated Systems Plan published by AEMO; or
- an interconnector converted from a market network service provider to a regulated interconnector[4];
- The Minister from each NEM region the interconnector connects to must be a party to the Agreement.
- Ministers of any NEM regions whose Co-ordinating Network Service Provider (CNSP) will contribute revenue under the Agreement must be party to the Agreement.
- The Agreement must be binding and executed as a deed and not subject to unfulfilled conditions.
- The Agreement must specify one TNSP as the responsible TNSP and all contributing Co-ordinating TNSPs.
Additionally, the Agreement must contain the transfer amounts or the method for calculating the transfer amounts.
Changes made to revenue calculations for TNSPs
An agreement under the New Rule to alter the approach to allocating interconnector costs does not alter the total amount of revenue the TNSP for the interconnector can recover (called its aggregate annual revenue requirement or AARR). The effect of the agreement is to alter the proportion of that revenue that the TNSP recovers from transmission customers (equal to the transfer amounts) in the adjacent region connected to it by the relevant interconnectors.
The TNSP subtracts the transfer amounts it receives from the total revenue it is permitted to collect. This ensures the TNSP cannot collect revenue for the cost of operating an interconnector from consumers in its region if it is entitled to receive a transfer amount under an agreement.
Where there is more than one TNSP within a region, the TNSP appointed as the CNSP collects the additional revenue from the other TNSPs that it is required to pay to the responsible TNSP. This ensures the amount of revenue the CNSP is approved to recover from its own customers is not reduced by the transfer amount.
The AER requires each responsible TNSP and CNSP to provide it details of the transfer amounts and the revenue that is being proposed to be collected towards the transfer amounts.
Key takeaways
Fairer cost outcomes for consumers: the New Rule allows Ministers to agree a cost allocation that can smooth asymmetric bill impacts, particularly if the impact may delay or jeopardise delivery of an interconnector. The New Rules will therefore be of interest for projects where there is a risk that one region may bear a disproportionate share of the costs, even if the project offers net benefits to the entire NEM. This is especially relevant for projects like Marinus Link, which will derive a portion of its revenues from Tasmania, one of the smallest NEM regions by consumer base.
Improves bankability of interconnector projects:
- 1. Revenue certainty: The changes are expected to support investment in future interconnector projects. The Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) publicly supported the New Rule in its submissions to the AEMC, highlighting the rule's role in providing revenue certainty, which is a critical factor for securing the necessary financing. This certainty will enable projects like Marinus Link to meet their financial obligations, including debt repayments, while accelerating Australia's broader energy transition goals.
- 2. Financial viability: The New Rule also enhances the financial viability of crucial infrastructure projects. By addressing the challenges of cost recovery across regions, it paves the way for more timely investments and ensures that projects like Marinus Link can proceed with confidence, benefiting both regional consumers and the entire NEM.
3. Jurisdictional clarity: The New Rule addresses the current ambiguity which affects how cost allocation applies to projects that span Commonwealth waters. This uncertainty can complicate the planning, approval and financing processes for offshore energy infrastructure and was a key area of concern for the CEFC with respect to the Marinus Link Project.
4. Enhanced support for Australia’s net-zero goals: The New Rule is expected to accelerate the development of critical interconnectors, supporting Australia’s transition to a net-zero emissions economy. For example, Marinus Link will provide the NEM with greater access to Tasmania’s existing hydro capacity, along with wind resources and energy storage capability, which are a reliable source of low-cost, on-demand, clean energy. By enabling a more equitable cost-sharing model, the rule encourages investment in infrastructure needed for renewable energy integration, which benefits all NEM regions.
[1] Interconnectors connect the transmission networks in two NEM regions, allowing excess electricity generated in one region to be transmitted to and consumed when the adjacent region is experiencing excess demand. This increases system reliability and can put downward pressure on electricity prices. Back to article
[2] Where a region has a Coordinating Network Service Provider (CNSP) (such as Victoria), the New Rule will apply to the CNSP in this capacity. Back to article
[3] A pricing methodology explains how a TNSP will allocate the revenue it is approved to recover from its customers to the different services it provides and, relevantly for present purposes, how it calculated and allocated the MLEC. Back to article
[4] This is directed to enable Basslink to benefit from the New Rule after it converts a regulated interconnector. Back to article